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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Petitioner Jessica D. Jacobsen is from an Order Granting 
Motion for Review of the Labor Commission, State of Utah, dated April 30, 1998. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a) 
and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1998). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Labor Commission correctly applied the legal causation standard as 
established in Allen v. Industrial Commission 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), in concluding that 
Ms. Jacobsen's one-time-only lift of a food tray did not amount to unusual or extraordinary 
exertion. 
This Court's review is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), 
which provides relief if an agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law. Utah Code 
1 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1998). "The [Labor] Commission has been granted broad discretion 
to determine the facts and apply the law. The Utah Code expressly provides that 'the 
commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts 
and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter it administers." Caporoz v. Labor 
Commission. 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1997) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-16(l)1). 
"Where the Legislature's grant of discretion is as broad as that set forth in section 35-1-16(1), 
the intermediate standard of review . . . applies." Osman v. Industrial Commission. 958 P.2d 
240, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Under the intermediate standard of review, [the court] 
look[s] for an abuse of discretion . . . [to] determine whether the agency decision exceeded the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality." ]sL (quotations omitted). Accord VanLeeuwen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
DETCRMBVATiyg LAW 
The determinative provision is Utah Code Ann § 35-1-45(1) (1992)2, which reads as 
follows: 
Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and 
in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if 
the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount 
of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
*This section has been recodified as 34A-1-301 (1998). 
2This section has been recodified as 34A-2-401 (1998). 
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This section of the Workers' Compensation Act was interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), to require a claimant to 
prove medical and legal causation. Particularly, "where the claimant suffers from a 
preexisting condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is 
required to prove legal causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or 
ordinary exertion is sufficient." LJL at 26 (emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of the Proceedings, and Statement of Facts 
This case concerns a disputed workers' compensation claim. The Labor Commission 
has denied Ms. Jacobsen's claim for workers' compensation benefits as a result of an alleged 
industrial accident which occurred on May 6, 1992, while she was employed as a waitress by 
Respondent Salt Lake Hilton. She claims that her injury occurred while "lifting a tray of food 
from a service station." 
This case was originally assigned to Administrative Law Judge Timothy Allen, and a 
hearing was held before him on August 20, 1993.3 (R. at 110-205.) Ms. Jacobsen worked as 
a waitress for Respondent Hilton Hotel from January 16 to August 29, 1992. (R. at 2-3, 61-
62.) Ms. Jacobsen was a part-time employee, (R. at 1-3), whose "work duties included 
3Ms. Jacobsen has not challenged the factual findings of the Labor Commission's 
Order. Rather, she alleges that the Commission erred in applying the legal causation standard 
established in Allen to these factual findings. The Labor Commission's factual findings are 
found on pages 614-615 of the Record. 
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transporting food items from the kitchen to her customers' tables." (R. at 614.)She "typically 
accomplished this task by placing a large oval tray on a platform outside the kitchen area 
known as the 'food service station.' The platform was slightly less than chest high. Ms. 
Jacobsen would load the tray with various food items, then lift the tray to her left shoulder to 
carry the food items to restaurant patrons' tables." (R. at 614.) 
On the day of the alleged accident, while standing straight forward, Ms. Jacobsen 
placed her left hand under the tray, steadied it with her right hand, and lifted it to her 
shoulder. (R. at 614-615.) "She bent her knees slightly and lifted the tray to her left shoulder, 
a vertical distance of between 12 and 18 inches." (R. at 615.) "There was no evidence that 
the tray was unbalanced or unstable." (R. at 615.) There was no indication that the lifting 
occurred in any kind of awkward or unusual manner. In fact, Susie Beucher, Ms. Jacobsen's 
supervisor who witnessed the incident, testified that as Ms. Jacobsen lifted the tray her back 
was straight, (R. at 189), and there was nothing unusual about the manner in which she lifted 
the tray. (R. at 190.) The Labor Commission found that the tray weighed between 16 and 30 
pounds.4 (R. at 614.) As Ms. Jacobsen lifted the tray, she felt pain in her upper back and left 
arm, and numbness in her left hand. (R. at 615.) 
^he exact weight of the tray was disputed by the parties. Ms. Jacobsen changed her 
estimates of the tray's weight at various times during her pursuit of benefits, guessing that it 
weighed anywhere from thirty to fifty-five pounds. (R. at 118, 243.) At the time that she 
originally reported her injury, Ms. Jacobsen estimated the weight of the tray to be about thirty 
pounds. (R. at 140, 223.) In contrast, Ms. Beucher testified that she observed Ms. Jacobsen 
at the time of her alleged accident and later reconstructed the tray and its content in order to 
determine its weight. Ms. Beucher testified that the reconstructed tray weighed 16 xk pounds. 
(R. at 194-195.) 
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Ms. Jacobsen sought medical treatment at Workcare the next day, where two treating 
physicians diagnosed her problem as degenerative disc disease. (R. at 147.) She sought 
another opinion from Dr. Craig McQueen, who agreed with this diagnosis and placed her in 
physical therapy until July 15, 1992, when she returned to work. (R. at 61, 147-148.) 
Claiming that she was unable to perform her work, Ms. Jacobsen left employment with 
Hilton permanently on August 29, 1992. (R. at 62-63.) She applied for workers' 
compensation benefits which Hilton denied. 
At the hearing, Ms. Jacobsen's medical records were placed into evidence, (R. at 238-
573), demonstrating that she suffered from a pre-existing osteoarthritis condition in her neck 
which contributed to the injury which she suffered on May 6, 1992. (R. at 79.) The records 
revealed that Ms. Jacobsen had been involved in a gymnastics accident while she was a 
teenager, resulting in a head injury and broken arms. (R. at 157.) They also showed that in 
1971, she was diagnosed as having a congenital unstable back. (R. at 215.) Further, she 
sustained a neck injury in 1982 from an automobile accident, (R. at 158), and the next year 
she was diagnosed with generative disc disease. (R. at 216.) In fact, Ms. Jacobsen was under 
the constant care of a chiropractor from January 1992 up to and including May 5, 1992, the 
day before the industrial incident. (R. at 438-451.) 
Following the hearing, Judge Allen issued Preliminary Findings of Fact and referred 
the case to a medical panel. (R. at 40-47.) As a part of the medical panel's report, the panel 
apportioned two-thirds of Ms. Jacobsen's permanent impairment to the cervical spine to pre-
existing conditions. (R. at 54.) On February 4, 1994, Judge Allen issued the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in which he erroneously found that Ms. Jacobsen did not 
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suffer from a pre-existing condition which would trigger the legal cause defense as asserted by 
Respondents pursuant to the criteria set forth in Allen v, Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986). Upon review of Judge Allen's Order, the Labor Commission found that Ms. 
Jacobsen did in fact suffer from a pre-existing condition which had been aggravated by her 
"cumulative" activities while working for Hilton. (R. at 79.) The Labor Commission took it 
upon itself to characterize those activities to be unusual trauma or stress. The case was then 
reviewed by this Court, which reversed the Labor Commission, by noting that the Commission 
had erred in adopting, sua sponte, a theory of "cumulative trauma", which had not been 
properly pled by Ms. Jacobsen in the proceedings before the Commission. Hilton Hotel v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 897 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995). (R. at 58576-585.) This Court reversed 
the Commission, and remanded this matter to the Commission for determination of a single 
issue: 
. . . we remand the case to the Commission to determine whether 
that single lifting episode amounted to an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion. 
(R. at 584-585, emphasis added.) 
Upon remand, this case was assigned for further proceedings before Judge Kathleen H. 
Switzer.5 (R. at 588.) An additional hearing was held on March 18, 1997, at which time oral 
arguments were made but no additional factual evidence was presented. (R. at 590.) On 
November 2, 1997, Judge Switzer issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
concluding that the lifting incident of May 6, 1992, constituted "extraordinary and unusual 
5Judge Allen had retired from the Labor Commission as an Administrative Law Judge. 
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exertion." Based upon this conclusion, the ALJ ordered Respondents to pay Petitioner workers 
compensation benefits. (R. at 592.) 
On December 1, 1997, Respondents filed a Motion for Review of Judge Switzer's 
Order. (R. at 595-605.) Ms. Jacobsen filed her response on January 6, 1998. (R. at 607-
610.) On April 30, 1998, the Labor Commission entered an order granting Hilton's Motion 
for Review. (R. at 614-616.) The Labor Commission explained: 
The Labor Commission considers Ms. Jacobsen's exertion as similar to lifting 
boxes or other items onto a closet or garage shelf, or some other storage area. 
Her exertion also is comparable to lifting items into airplane overhead storage 
racks and participating in various sporting or exercise activities. It is also 
similar to lifting and playing with small children. Other activities involving 
similar exertion could be cited as well. As such, Ms. Jacobsen's exertion was 
neither unusual nor extraordinary when compared to the activities of modern 
everyday life. 
(R. at 615-616, emphasis added.) The Labor Commission accordingly found that Ms. 
Jacobsen had failed to meet the applicable test for legal causation and determined that her 
claim is not compensable under the Utah Workers Compensation Act. (R. at 616.) 
On May 28, 1998, Ms. Jacobsen filed her Petition for Writ of Review with this Court. 
(R. at 618.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Since Ms. Jacobsen suffers from a pre-existing condition to her cervical spine, she is 
required to demonstrate that her single lifting episode of a 16-30 pound food tray constituted 
unusual or extraordinary exertion. The determination of what constitutes unusual or 
extraordinary exertion is made on an objective basis, comparing the exertion required of men 
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and women engaged in typical activities of modern day life. The Labor Commission properly 
concluded that Ms. Jacobsen's lift of the food tray did not constitute unusual or extraordinary 
exertion. The Labor Commission provided numerous examples of common and typical 
activities which were similar to Ms. Jacobsen's action in lifting the food tray. The 
Commission's conclusion was well reasoned and a reasonable application of the facts of this 
case to the higher standard of legal causation under Allen. 
This Court should reject Ms. Jacobsen's proposal to adopt a new rule which would 
award benefits to a claimant any time there is "fair debate" as to what constitutes unusual or 
* 
extraordinary exertion. The Legislature and appellate courts have recognized the Labor 
Commission's central role in applying the Workers' Compensation Act and defining the scope 
of activities which will be considered unusual and extraordinary. The Labor Commission's 
discretion in determining these matters should be maintained by this Court where it evident 
that the Commission has applied the law in a reasonable and rationale manner. In the present, 
case, the Order of Labor Commission reflects that the Commission carefully and fully 
considered the particular facts of Ms. Jacobsen's action in lifting the food tray and reasonably 
concluded that they did not constitute unusual or extraordinary exertion. This Court should 
accordingly affirm the order of the Labor Commission. 
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ARGUMENT 
L MS. JACOBSEN!S SINGLE LIFTING EPISODE DID NOT 
AMOUNT TO UNUSUAL OR EXTRAORDINARY 
EXERTION. 
The case of Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), is the seminal 
case concerning legal causation in workers compensation cases. In Allen, the claimant was 
working in a confined cooler located at his place of employment. The claimant was stacking 
crates from the floor onto a cooler shelf. Each crate contained four to six gallons of milk and 
weighed approximately fifty (50) pounds. While lifting one crate to about chest level, he 
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower back. Subsequently, the claimant obtained a 
myelogram which revealed a herniated disc. hL at 17. 
In Allen, the claimant testified he had a history of prior back injuries. The sole issue 
on appeal was whether the claimant, who had suffered pre-existing back problems and was 
injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for his job, was injured "by accident 
arising out of or in the course of employment" as required by the Workers' Compensation Act. 
IdL at 18. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1998). 
In order to arise out of and in the course of employment, a causal connection between 
the injury and employment must exist. The standard of proof for establishing a causal 
connection is "by a preponderance of the evidence/ Allen. 729 P.2d at 23. The court 
explained, 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a pre-
existing condition must show that the employment contributed 
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something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in 
every day life because of his condition. This additional element 
of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life, and serves to 
offset the pre-existing condition of the employee as a likely cause 
of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments 
resulting from a personal risk factor rather than exertions at 
work. 
Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
In other words, "where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. Where there is no pre-existing condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient." 
JiL at 26 (emphasis added). Whether an exertion is usual or unusual is defined according to an 
objective standard. The comparison does not involve an employee's normal employment 
exertion and the exertion at the time of injury; rather, the Court must compare the exertion at 
the time of injury with the exertions of normal non-employment life of men and women in the 
latter half of the 20th century. IiL Typical activities cited in Allen as requiring normal 
exertion of men and women in the latter part of the 20th century include "taking full garbage 
cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an 
automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in buildings/ M,. 
The Allen case is critical in analyzing the facts of the present case. Since Ms. Jacobsen 
suffered from significant pre-existing neck condition, the legal causation test requires that her 
one-time-only lift of a 16 lA to 30 pound food tray from chest to shoulder height exceed the 
exertion that is typically required of the average person in non-employment life. The Labor 
Commission properly concluded that it did not. The Commission explained, 
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The Labor Commission considers Ms. Jacobsen's exertion as 
similar to lifting boxes or other items onto a closet or garage 
shelf, or some other storage area. Her exertion also is 
comparable to lifting items into airplane overhead storage racks 
and participating in various sporting or exercise activities. It is 
also similar to lifting and playing with small children. Other 
activities involving similar exertion could be cited as well. As 
such, Ms. Jacobsen's exertion was neither unusual nor 
extraordinary when compared to the activities of modern 
everyday life. 
(R. at 615-616.) The examples cited by the Labor Commission are ordinary and common 
activities required of men and women in modern non-employment life.6 
There is no evidence that the manner in which Ms. Jacobsen lifted the tray was in any 
way unusual or extraordinary. In fact, the single other eyewitness to the episode testified that 
Ms. Jacobsen was standing with her back straight, facing forward, and lifted her tray in the 
usual and proper manner. (R. at 189.) Furthermore, the weight of the tray itself was not 
significant. As evidenced by the numerous examples cited by the Labor Commission, the 
general public is constantly and repeatedly engaged in lifting weights 16-30 pounds from chest 
or waist level to at least shoulder level. The court may take judicial notice of the height of 
closet shelving and the items stored thereon to easily conclude that lifting such weights to such 
levels is commonplace.7 
6Notably, the Allen court included in its list of typical activities "lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel" and "lifting a small child." 729 P.2d at 26. 
7The ALJ found it significant that the food tray was loaded with dishes which required 
balancing while lifting. Notably, however,"there was no evidence that the tray was 
unbalanced or unstable" at any time. (R. at 615.) There was nothing awkward or unusual 
about Ms. Jacobsen's short lift of the tray. Moreover, there is nothing inherently unusual or 
extraordinary in the exertion required to balance an item while lifting. 
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The Labor Commission concluded that the exertion required of Ms. Jacobsen in lifting 
the food tray twelve to eighteen inches was not unusual and extraordinary. Lifting the tray did 
not, as the Allen court declared, contribute "something substantial to increase the risk [s]he 
already faced in everyday life because of [her pre-existing neck] condition." Allen. 729 P.2d 
at 25. The Labor Commission's application of the Allen standard to the particular facts of this 
case are reasonable and rationale. The Labor Commission carefully and fully reviewed the 
facts of this case and concluded that lifting the food tray was not unlike many common 
activities required of men and women of the latter half of the twentieth century. The Labor 
Commission's properly exercised its discretion in making this conclusion. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the Labor Commission's Order dismissing Ms. Jacobsen's claim. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT MS. JACOBSEN'S 
PROPOSAL TO ADOPT A NEW STANDARD WHICH 
WOULD ELIMINATE THE LABOR COMMISSION'S 
DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE ALLEN STANDARD. 
The application of the higher standard of legal causation established in Allen involves a 
mixed question of "whether a given set of facts come within the reach of a given rule of law." 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). This Court accordingly applies 
an intermediate standard of review, looking for "an abuse of discretion" or in other words, 
"whether the agency decision exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Osman 
v. Industrial Comm'n. 958 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Ms. Jacobsen would have this Court adopt a new standard; one which would 
completely eliminate the Labor Commission's discretion in adjudicating disputed claims. 
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Specifically, Ms. Jacobsen asserts that this Court should adopt a new rule that whenever a 
"workers' injurious exertion is subject to fair debate as to whether it was unusual or 
extraordinary, the Commission must, consistent with the previously enunciated law of this 
State, resolve that issue in favor of the injured worker." (Petitioner's brief at 6-7.) 
In adopting the higher standard of legal causation in Allen, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "the case law will eventually define a standard for typical 'nonemployment activity' 
in much the way case law has developed the standard of care for the reasonable man in tort 
law." 729 P.2d at 26. Shortly thereafter, in Price River Coal v. Industrial Commission. 731 
P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986), the court declared that "[t]he concept of 'unusual or extraordinary' 
exertion remains to be fleshed out over time. Of necessity, the process of pouring specific 
content into that concept will rely heavily upon the Commission's expertise in and familiarity 
with the work environment." This Court has also recognized the Labor Commission's central 
role in defining the scope of activities which will be viewed as "unusual and extraordinary." 
£££ Smith & Edwards Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, the both Utah Legislature, through its statutory grant of authority, and the 
appellate courts, through case law, have repeatedly recognized that the Labor Commission 
serves an invaluable and central role in defining the scope of activities which will be 
considered "unusual and extraordinary" for purposes of applying the higher standard of legal 
causation under Allen. 
In Sisco Hike v. Industrial Commission. 766 P.2d 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this 
Court rejected the adoption of a bright line test to determine what constitutes unusual or 
extraordinary exertion. Rather, this Court declared that what constitutes "unusual or 
13 
extraordinary" exertion depends upon the unique facts and circumstances of the employment 
activity that is required. IJL Significant deference and discretion are accordingly afforded to 
the Labor Commission's application of the Allen standard to the particular set of facts in each 
case. See, e ^ , Drake, 939 P.2d at 182 (deference is afforded to Commission's decision on 
scope-of-employment issues because of their highly fact-dependent nature). 
Notably, Ms. Jacobsen cites the Drake decision in support of her asserted new rule to 
resolve any dispute in favor of the claimant. In Drake, the claimant was injured in an motor 
vehicle accident after making a delivery to the Ogden office of her employer. Ms. Drake 
argued that her injuries arose out of the course and scope of her employment because she was 
on a "special errand" for her employer at the time of the accident. The Labor Commission 
denied Ms. Drake benefits finding that the special errand rule did not apply in her case. On 
appeal, this Court reversed the Labor Commission. This Court applied a correction of error 
standard, coming to its own conclusion that Ms. Drake was on a "special errand" at the time 
her accident. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, finding that this Court had applied an 
incorrect standard of review. The Supreme Court concluded that because scope of 
employment issues are highly fact-dependent, the Labor Commission's decisions in such cases 
should be granted heightened deference. While the Supreme Court recognized that the 
Workers Compensation Act is to "be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage," the 
court nevertheless affirmed the Labor Commission's denial of workers compensation benefits 
to Ms. Drake stating, "Under the standard enunciated above, we defer to the Commission's 
decision and accord a strong presumption that the deliveries were not 'special,'" and therefore 
non-compensable. Id* at 183. 
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The Allen court's adoption of the higher standard of legal causation reflects a balance 
of interests. As the court explained, the statutory requirements were intended to ensure 
that compensation is only awarded where there is a sufficient 
causal connection between the disability and the working 
conditions . . . . distinguishing] between those injuries which (a) 
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition 
results in symptoms which appear during work hours without any 
enhancement from the workplace, and (b) those injuries which 
occur because some condition or exertion required by the 
employment increases the risk of injury which the worker 
normally faces in his everyday life. 
729 P.2d at 24 (emphasis added). 
The Labor Commission has been assigned the duty to adjudicate disputed workers 
compensation claims. Ms. Jacobsen's proposal that this Court adopt a new rule which would 
always award benefits to the claimant when there is a fair debate"%s to what constitutes 
unusual and extraordinary exertion completely ignores the role of the Labor Commission. The 
Commission only reviews a claim for benefits when there is a dispute. Otherwise, benefits are 
simply paid by the employer/carrier to the claimant. 
Recognizing that the Labor Commission has the knowledge and experience regarding 
the duties of the workplace, the Legislature expressly granted the Commission the full 
authority and discretion to find facts and apply the provisions of the Workers Compensation 
Act. The appellate courts have properly concluded that the Labor Commission's discretion in 
making these conclusions should be recognized and maintained. The Workers Compensation 
Act represents a balancing of interests. It provides an employee a more convenient and timely 
payment of compensation without subjecting her to the rigors of proving fault. To the 
employer it provides an established set of prerequisites that an employee must meet before they 
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are eligible for compensation. First and most importantly, the employee must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that her injuries were legally and medically caused by her 
employment. In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the Act to require a claimant to 
who has a pre-existing condition to demonstrate that her employment subjected her to a risk of 
injury which is substantially greater than that which she faced in performing the tasks of 
normal, everyday life. 
In the present case, the Labor Commission correctly determined that Ms. Jacobsen's 
single lifting episode of a food tray weighing 16 V2 to 30 pounds8 did not constitute unusual 
and extraordinary exertion. The Order provides an explanation of the Commission's 
conclusion which is a reasonable and rationale application of the law to the particular facts of 
this case. The Commission's denial of benefits does not become "unreasonable" simply 
because there may be "fair debate" as to what constitutes unusual and extraordinary exertion. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Labor Commission's Order and dismiss Ms. 
Jacobsen's claim for workers compensation benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no dispute that since Ms. Jacobsen suffered from a pre-existing cervical spine 
condition, she must meet the higher standard of legal causation by demonstrating that her 
employment required unusual and extraordinary exertion. The Labor Commission properly 
8As noted previously, the weight of the food tray was disputed by the parties. The 
Commission's finding that the tray could have weighed up to 30 pounds reflects a benefit of 
the doubt accorded to Ms. Jacobsen on this issue. 
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concluded that Ms. Jacobsen's exertion was similar to that required in ordinary and common 
tasks required of men and women in modern lift. The Commission explained that Ms. 
Jacobsen's action was "similar to lifting boxes or other items onto a closet or garage shelf, . . . 
. lifting items into airplane overhead storage racks, Q participating in various sporting or 
exercise activities, . . . . [and] lifting and playing with small children." (R. at 615.) The 
Commission's conclusion was a reasonable and rationale application of the workers 
compensation law to the facts of this case. 
This Court should reject Ms. Jacbosen's proposal of a new rule which would award 
benefits whenever there is a dispute between the parties concerning the application of the 
Workers Compensation Act. Rather, the Legislature and appellate courts have recognized the 
Labor Commission's central role in defining the boundaries of activities that will be considered 
unusual or extraordinary. The Labor Commission's discretion in making this determination 
should be maintained as long as it is reasonable and rationale. 
It is respectfully submitted that Ms. Jacobsen's appeal should be denied, and this Court 
should affirm the Order of the Labor Commission. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Bff day of October, 1998. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
Stuart L. Poelman 
Dori K. Petersen 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Salt Lake Hilton and/or 
United Pacific Reliance Insurance 
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